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INTRODUCTION
The extraterritorial application of United States laws has emerged
as an important problem affecting trade relations between the United
States and other countries.' To an increasing degree, the United States
has asserted the view that worldwide application of certain American
policies and laws is essential to safeguard U.S. foreign policy, eco-
nomic, and security interests. Many other states regard this assertion
of American authority as unwarranted and disruptive when it reaches
conduct within their borders. Not only are American methods of
judicial process and discovery much different from those accepted in
other countries but also American legal policies often conflict with
what other countries regard as their important sovereign interests.
The resulting conflicts increase tensions between the United States
and other countries and constitute an important barrier to smooth
security, trade, and economic relationships between the United States
and its trading partners around the world.
* The author wishes to acknowledge the Canadian Embassy for its funding of
this research project. Mr. Jonathan Fried, Congressional Relations Office, Canadian
Embassy, is owed a particular debt of gratitude.
** Dorinda G. Dallmeyer is Research Director of the Dean Rusk Center for
International and Comparative Law, University of Georgia School of Law, Athens,
Georgia.
See generally Conference on Extraterritoriality for the Business and the Prac-
ticing Lawyer, 15 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1095-1221 (1983) (eleven articles including
a bibliography); Comments of the European Community on the Amendments of
June 22, 1982, to the U.S. Export Administration Regulations (Aug. 12, 1982);
Schoenbaum and Dallmeyer, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws
Affecting Trade Between Nations, in DYNAMICS OF JAPANESE-UNITED STATES TRADE
RELATIONS (T. Schoenbaum, M. Matsushita, and D. Dallmeyer eds. 1986). See also
infra text accompanying notes 47-54.
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One example of this extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws is in the
control of exports of U.S. goods and technology. The United States
asserts jurisdiction over both direct exports from its territory as well
as the re-export of U.S.-origin goods, parts, and technology from
other countries. 2 These controls may be invoked to protect U.S.
national security interests and to promote U.S. foreign policy ob-
jectives. U.S. national security concerns are often pursued in concert
with other nations by means of multilateral arrangements such as the
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, better
known as COCOM.3 This group of 15 nations is composed of the
NATO allies minus Iceland plus Japan and Australia. COCOM de-
cides uniform national security export controls on the shipment of
military and dual-use goods and technology to certain destinations. 4
Because items on the COCOM list are included by multilateral con-
sensus, there is virtually no controversy regarding the necessity that
their export be controlled, although at times the consensus may be
fragile. Canada and the United States have also worked together on
a bilateral basis to control the export of strategic goods.
In contrast, U.S. foreign policy controls more often are pursued
unilaterally and may encompass not only strategic goods but also
militarily insignificant goods as well. This may range from narrow
controls over specific commodities to broadly dissociating the United
States from another country. By its unilateral attempts to enforce its
export controls over conduct taking place wholly outside its territory,
the United States, especially in the last decade, has created much
resentment among its allies.'
2 See U.S. Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420; Export
Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. pts. 768-799 (1989).
1 For further descriptions of COCOM's activities, see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENcEs, BALANcING THE NATIONAL INTEREST 97-99 (1987); Mastanduno, The Man-
agement of Alliance Export Control Policy: American Leadership and the Politics
of COCOM, in CONTROLLING EAST-WEST TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 241-
79 (G. Bertsch ed. 1988) [hereinafter Bertsch]; Nau, Export Controls and Free Trade:
Squaring the Circle in COCOM, in Bertsch 390-416; Root, COCOM: An Appraisal
of Objectives and Needed Reforms, in Bertsch 417-42; 62 CONG. DIG. 165, 192
(1983).
1 Although COCOM regulations are not made public, an examination of the
export control regulations of its member countries may reveal the mutually-agreed
upon standards of the organization. The 1987 incident involving the sale of COCOM-
controlled machinery to the Soviet Union by Japan's Toshiba Machine and Norway's
Kongsberg Trading Company, which gave the Soviets the ability to make their
submarines run more quietly, is just one example of COCOM's Weakness in preventing
such transfers. See Note, Of Ropes, Buttons and Four-By-Fours: Import Sanctions
for Violations of the COCOM Agreement, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 249 (1989).
1 See infra text accompanying notes 47-51.
[Vol. 19:565
CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Unlike a number of other Western allies, Canada has not been in
direct conflict with the United States over its more egregious foreign
policy controls in recent times. Since the Hyde Park Declaration of
1941, both countries have worked together to reinforce the concept
of North America as a single, unified defense industrial base. 6 The
United States and Canada have concluded a series of bilateral agree-
ments to develop a common external export control framework for
strategic goods.7 Since World War II, trade between the two countries
has been exempt from export restrictions in exchange for the assurance
that each country would control the re-export of goods from the
other country, so that one country did not become a "back door"
for exports of the products of the other. However, Canada is not
immune to the extraterritorial reach of U.S. export controls. These
agreements have not ensured symmetry of enforcement of export
controls because of differences between Canadian and U.S. laws
governing the extent of goods and technologies controlled and the
assertion of jurisdiction over those items .
The most recent bilateral trade agreement between the two countries
is the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which
entered into force January 1, 1989. 9 Canada and the United States
have a unique economic relationship with the world. While Canada
is the United States' largest trading partner, the United States accounts
for over three-quarters of Canada's exports. 0 In light of these close
ties, the FTA anticipates the establishment of a fully integrated North
American market. It provides for the regulation and eventual elimi-
nation of tariffs, contingent protection measures (antidumping duties,
6 See Fried, The Impact of U.S. Export Controls on Trade Between Canada
and the United States, 11 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 185, 189-91 (1986). The "Hyde Park
Declaration" refers to a joint statement issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Mackenzie King following discussions at Hyde Park, New York,
on April 20, 1941. The official title was a "Declaration Regarding Cooperation for
War Production."
7 See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 700.55 (1989) and 15 C.F.R. pt. 700 App. IV (1988)
for regulations governing United States-Canada defense mobilization.
I See infra text accompanying notes 57-66.
9 For the text of the Agreement, see RICHARD & DEARDEN, TiE CANADA-U.S.
FRE TRADE AGREEMENT 75-328 (1988). Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,
Dec. 22, 1987, reprinted in, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter FTA].10 In 1986, nearly 80 percent of Canadian exports went to the United States,
while Canada received nearly 25 percent of all U.S. exports, twice the value of U.S.
exports to Japan. See Battram, Canada-United States Trade Negotiations: Continental
Accord or a Continent Apart, 22 INT'L LAW. 346 (1988). See generally DIEBOLD,
BILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND CANADA IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (1988).
1989]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
countervailing duties, and escape clause or safeguard actions), and
other non-tariff barriers to trade between the two countries, such as
export controls.
This paper begins with a comparison of the Canadian and U.S.
export control structures. It examines resulting conflicts between the
two. It then describes the provisions of the Free Trade Agreement
which address the harmonization of export controls. While the Agree-
ment is far-reaching, it is important to note that the FTA is not a
Customs Union. 1 That is, the two countries are not going to develop
a common external trade policy but will continue to maintain in-
dependent trade relations with respect to third countries. In light of
that fact, the paper analyzes the prospects for continuing conflict
between the United States and Canada over export licensing in the
foreign policy control area. It examines subsequent U.S. legislation
that may alleviate some of the existing inequities. Finally, the paper
suggests additional approaches to facilitate the resolution of future
disputes over export control policy.
CANADIAN EXPORT CONTROLS
The authority for Canadian ,export controls lies principally in the
Export and Import Permits Act.12 Under the Act, controls may be
imposed to assure that military or strategic goods will not be exported
to a destination "wherein their use might be detrimental to the security
of Canada."' 3 This language echoes "national security" concerns
common in the export control regimes of other COCOM nations.
Goods and technologies subject to control appear on the Export
Control List 4 which is divided into ten major groups. 5 Group 9
" See RlcHAR & DEARDEN, supra note 9, at 8. The classic example of a Customs
Union is the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community
with a common external trade tariff for all Member States. Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 3 U.N.T.S. III.
12 R.S.C., ch. E-19 (1985).
13 Id. § 3(a).
" Id. § 3. See also VI Consolidated Regulations of Canada, chap. 601 [hereinafter
cited as C.R.C.].
1 Group 1 covers controls on the export of animals and agricultural products.
VI C.R.C. §§ 1001-1021. Group 2 covers wood and wood products. Id. §§ 2001-
2002. Groups 3 through 6 control military and strategic goods drawn almost entirely
from the COCOM Industrial List. Id. §§ 3072-3920 (general purpose industrial
machinery and electronics); §§ 4416-4485 (transportation equipment; §§ 5601-5673
(metals, minerals, and their manufactured products); §§ 6701-6781 (chemicals, me-
talloids, and petroleum products). Canada's Group 7 is the COCOM Munitions List.
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covers U.S.-origin goods.16 In exchange for U.S.-origin goods entering
Canada without the necessity of U.S. export licenses, Canada pledges
that Canadian export permits will be required for any subsequent
export of those goods from Canada to third countries unless they
have been substantially transformed in "value, form, or use of the
goods, or in the production of new goods."'"
In Group 10 Canada ensures that technical data in material form
that is used in the design, production, operation, or testing of equip-
ment, and materials described in Groups 3 through 9 of the Export
Control List are controlled." Therefore, because of the protection
extended to U.S.-origin goods by their inclusion in Group 9, Canadian
export controls also protect U.S. technology as long as it is in material
form.
In addition to the Export Control List, Canada has an Area Control
List' 9 covering those countries for which export controls are deemed
necessary. The Area Control List covers eastern nations2 as well as
Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, and Libya. Permits are required
for the exportation of almost all goods, regardless of whether or not
they appear on the Export Control List.
The Export Control List and the Area Control List in combination
control the export of strategic goods to all destinations. The United
States stands alone in its privilege of receiving exports of nearly all
goods license-free.
In addition to the controls embodied in the Export Control List
and the Area Control List, the Prime Minister acting on behalf of
the government has the discretion to invoke foreign policy controls
of the export of strategic, military, and military-related equipment
in a narrow range of circumstances. 21 Export controls can be invoked
to prevent shipment of these goods to countries posing a military
threat to Canada, to countries engaged in hostilities or where there
Id. §§ 7001-7022. (This list includes arms, munitions, military, naval, or air stores).
Items in Group 8 are controlled because of their relevance to atomic energy, and
are controlled either by COCOM agreements or other international obligations. VI
C.R.C. §§ 8001-8141. Groups 3 through 8 are based principally upon the International
Lists established by COCOM, which define those industrial goods, munitions, and
technologies considered to be strategic and thus subject to export control.
6 Id. §§ 9001-9002.
17 Id. § 9001.
Is Id. § 10003.
19 R.S.C., ch. E-19, § 4 (1985).
VI C.R.C., chap. 600 (list of countries).
21 Fried, supra note 6, at 188.
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is an imminent threat of hostilities, or to countries subject to United
Nations bans on the shipment of arms.
Canada has employed foreign policy controls in several instances
in the past decade. 22 In 1980, following the taking of hostages in
Iran, Canada used foreign policy controls to cut off a wide variety
of goods to Iran as well as placing Iran temporarily on the Area
Control List. In 1982, Canada joined with the European Community
to impose limited sanctions (primarily to ban arms exports) against
Argentina in response to the Falklands/Malvinas military intervention.
Canada complies with the United Nations' mandatory arms embargo
for South Africa and it restricts as well the shipment of items on
the Export Control List, such as computers which might be used by
police departments and other law enforcement agencies to enforce
apartheid. And in 1986, Canada broadened its control of exports to
Libya to include not only its longstanding restrictions on the export
of military and strategic goods but also the export of oil drilling
equipment, particularly that containing technology unique to the West.
U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS
In contrast to the relatively simple and orderly Canadian system,
the United States relies on a series of statutes covering export control. 23
The main U.S. statute controlling exports is the Export Administration
Act (EAA). 4 In its original form as the Export Control Act of 1949,25
the act controlled goods and technology which would "make a sig-
nificant contribution to the military potential of any other country
or combination of countries which would prove detrimental to the
national security of the United States. ' 26 Additionally, Congress re-
cognized two other reasons justifying export controls: promoting
22 Id.
23 The major export control statutes are the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 2401-20 (non-emergency control of goods and technology for reasons of
national security, foreign policy, short supply, and nuclear non-proliferation); Trading
with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. 5(b) (wartime embargo or more specific control
of transactions); International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
06 (national emergency because of threat to national security, foreign policy, or
U.S. economy); Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (non-emergency controls
over defense articles); and Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2071-2078 (non-emergency
nuclear non-proliferation controls). For a useful guide to export controls, see P.
RAY, GUIDE TO EXPORT CONTROLS (1985).
24 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20.
23 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-32 (1964) (expired 1969).
26 Id. § 2021.
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American foreign policy and preventing domestic shortages.2 7 Al-
though the primary reason for the legislation was to serve national
security interests, by the late 1970's export controls were being used
more and more to manifest U.S. foreign policy interests. 28 In rec-
ognition of the growing importance of export controls as a weapon
to register U.S. displeasure with other nations, the EAA was amended
in 197929 to provide more guidance for the exercise of foreign policy
controls over exports.
The EAA is designed to cover all goods, all technology, and all
persons involved in the export chain in a licensing regime. This
approach allows the law to have as sweeping a jurisdictional base as
possible while carving out exceptions in the form of general licenses
for exports deemed not to require prior government approval. The
system is administered by the Department of Commerce, with advice
tendered from the Department of Defense on national security mat-
ters, and coordinated primarily with the Department of State on
foreign policy concerns. °0
With the exception of Canada,31 licensing controls exist for exports
and re-exports to Free World countries of most commodities con-
trolled for export to communist destinations as well as controls on
sensitive technical data, e.g., aircraft, hovercraft, and some types of
nuclear equipment.12 The main purpose for these controls on Free
World shipments is to prevent transshipment to destinations which
would not be approved to receive shipments directly.
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
The United States asserts very broad jurisdiction, authority, and
control over U.S.-origin goods and technology regardless of their
location and regardless of the amount of time which has elapsed
since the goods or technology left the United States. No other nation
in the world attempts to assert such extensive jurisdiction. Although
27 15 C.F.R. § 370.1 (1988).
21 See Long, The Executive, Congress, and Interest Groups in U.S. Export Control
Policy: The National Organization of Power, in Bertsch, supra note 3, at 47-54.
29 The Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. 97-72, 93 Stat. 503, § 6(e),
1979.
10 For an examination of inter-departmental struggles to gain primacy over export
controls, see McIntyre, The Distribution of Power and the Inter-agency Politics of
Licensing East-West High-Technology Trade, in Bertsch, supra note 3, at 97-133.
31 See 15 C.F.R. § 385.6(b) (1988).
32 See generally 15 C.F.R. pt. 385 (1988) (special country policies).
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the exact scope of the meanings are subject to some disagreement,
territoriality and nationality are accepted without question as per-
missible bases for assertion of jurisdiction.33 Of course, in the case
of re-exports, the territoriality principle cannot apply because the
goods or technology are no longer within the United States. While
the nationality principle is generally an accepted basis for jurisdiction
over natural and legal persons, traditionally it is not applied to
property. 4 Nevertheless, wide-ranging extraterritorial jurisdiction over
U.S.-origin goods, technology, and end-products of that technology
imbues those items with a "U.S. nationality" which follows them
wherever they go.
Because of its sweeping assertion of jurisdiction, the EAA has the
potential to be a major irritant in trade relations between the United
States and its allies. This is particularly true in the instance of export
controls based on U.S. foreign policy objectives which other countries
do not share. Since 1978 the United States has imposed foreign policy
controls of varying severity on a number of countries. 35 In early 1978,
in view of United Nations resolutions regarding apartheid in South
Africa, the United States imposed an embargo on direct and indirect
exports and re-exports of U.S.-origin goods and technical data for
use by military and police forces in South Africa. 6 The restrictions
encompassed not only exporters but also consignees, warehousers,
31 See Abbott, Defining the Extraterritorial Reach of American Export Controls:
Congress as Catalyst, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 79-158 (Winter 1984); Bierman, The
1983 Export Administration Act Legislation: The Extraterritoriality Issue, 15 L.
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1181-85 (1983); Marcuss & Mathias, U.S. Foreign Policy Export
Controls: Do They Pass Muster Under International Law?, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAWYER 1, 17-20 (1984); Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United
States Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 439, 440-47 (1981); Moyer & Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign
Policy: The History, Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15
L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 108-16 (1983). See also RESTATENENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17 (1965).
3 Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 33, at 21. See also L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW § 145 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1985).
3, See Dept. of Commerce's First Annual Report on Foreign Policy Export
Controls: Hearings on S.2076 Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-49 (1986).
15 C.F.R. § 385.4 (1988). While these restrictions are wide-ranging, they are
not as extensive as Canada's foreign policy controls. Interview with David Ryan,
Dept. of External Affairs, Jan. 19, 1989. For another aspect of the U.S. controls,
see Note, Federal Preemption and the South African Sanctions: A Survival Guide
for States and Cities, 10 Loy. L.A. INT'L & Comr. L.J. 693, 699-702 (1988); Marcuss
& Mathias, supra note 33, at 2-3.
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distributors, end-users, and service facilities, whether located in South
Africa or elsewhere.
In the Middle East, the United States has placed foreign policy
controls on exports of crime control and detection equipment and
on military vehicles and related production equipment destined for
Syria, Iran, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.37 Ad-
ditionally, Iran, Iraq, and Syria are subject to controls on certain
chemicals. These restrictions support U.S. foreign policy concerns
regarding the proliferation of chemical weapons.38
Libya has been the object of a series of foreign policy controls
since 1978.19 Beginning with imposition of licenses for certain off-
road transport vehicles, subsequent controls have covered aircraft,
helicopters, and some crime control equipment. By 1986 these controls
escalated to a total embargo on direct U.S.-Libya trade.
A series of export restrictions have been aimed at altering the
behavior of the Soviet Union in a number of arenas.40 To express
its disapproval of the treatment given Soviet dissidents, in 1978, the
United States imposed export controls on petroleum and natural gas
exploration and production equipment destined for the Soviet Union,
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.4' Additionally, exporters of related
technical data had to receive assurances from their importers that
neither the technical data nor its end-product would be shipped
directly or indirectly to the subject countries.
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in 1979, the United
States imposed both national security and foreign policy controls,
including a grain embargo. 42 Foreign policy concerns provided the
basis for imposing first stricter controls and then an embargo on
shipments of a range of phosphate fertilizers. 43 The President re-
quested a voluntary suspension of shipments of products for use at
the 1980 Summer Olympic Games. 44 Subsequently all goods and tech-
37 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(d) (1988).
38 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(e) (1988).
39 15 C.F.R. § 385.7 (1988). See Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 33, at 3-4.
40 See generally 15 C.F.R. § 385.2 (1988). For descriptions of the history of the
controls, see Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 33, at 4-6; Moyer & Mabry, supra
note 33, at 27-92.
41 43 Fed. Reg. 33,699 (1978).
42 45 Fed. Reg. 1883 (1980). See also 45 Fed. Reg. 3027 (1980). These controls
were extended to include Afghanistan to ensure against diversions of grain to Soviet
forces within the country. See 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(f) (1988).
41 45 Fed. Reg. 8293 (1980).
44 45 Fed. Reg. 21,612 (1980).
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nology for the Moscow Olympics was embargoed, 45 including exe-
cution of payments or transactions related to such exports. The final
foreign policy restriction engendered by the Afghanistan invasion was
to impose the requirement for a validated license to export truck
assembly lines to the Soviet's Kama River assembly plant, based on
the notion that vehicles produced there were being used to support
Soviet forces in Afghanistan.46
By December 1981, the Soviet Union had further impaired its
position with the United States by its support of the crackdown on
Polish dissidents. At that point, the Commerce Department broadened
its restrictions on petroleum industry equipment and data, this time
to include oil and gas transportation and refining technology. 47 Six
months later, with no improvement in the Polish situation, the con-
trols were broadened spectacularly. In June 1982, the Department of
Commerce promulgated regulations which sought to control not only
exports of American corporations but also deliveries of oil and gas
equipment to the Soviet Union by foreign corporations or branches
owned or controlled by American individuals or corporations and
even foreign corporations that produced goods under licensing agree-
ments with United States companies.48
When these foreign corporations followed the policies and laws of
their own governments and fulfilled the contracts involved with the
pipeline, they became subject to enforcement actions by the United
States Department of Commerce International Trade Administra-
tion.49 This agency issued export denial orders against a number of
European firms simply for using U.S.-origin technical data and in-
formation. 0 Foreign companies became embroiled in a series of ad-
41 President's Memorandum on Prohibition of U.S. Transactions with Respect
to the Olympic Games, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 559 (Mar. 28, 1980).
15 C.F.R. § 385.2(e) (1988). The Commerce Department stated that requests
for such licenses generally would be denied.
47 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (1982).
48 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982). Most of the countries affected were quite surprised
by the new regulations. Apparently the Reagan delegation to the Versailles economic
summit (held only two weeks before the regulations were expanded) gave no indication
that such a measure would be forthcoming. INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY
(BNA) No. 415, at 507 (July 13, 1982).
,9 See INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 422, at 795 (Aug.
31, 1982).
50 Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldridge, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 1982),
reprinted in INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 422, at 795-96
(Aug. 31, 1982).
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ministrative and judicial actions challenging the denial orders.5 The
companies were subjected to Department of Commerce orders denying
them export privileges for products coming from the United States,
i.e., a total blackout which denied them all business from the United
States. Later this blackout was modified to restrict only U.S.-origin
commodities or technical data relating to oil and gas production and
exploration.
Finally, President Reagan lifted the export sanctions on November
13, 1982.52 The United States, having taken an untenable position
with its allies, was forced to back down. In response to the disruption
created in the domestic business scene by the sanctions, in 1985,
Congress amended the EAA to shore up "contract sanctity," a con-
cept badly trodden upon by the pipeline restrictions.53 The pipeline
case remains the foremost example of the unilateral assertion of U.S.
foreign policy through the EAA.5 4
U.S.-CANADIAN CONFLICT OVER EXPORT CONTROLS
By virtue of the recognition that North America constitutes a single,
integrated defense industrial base, Canada to some extent has received
special treatment in the U.S. export control structure. Canada is the
sole exception to the licensing regime set up by the Export Admini-
stration Act. In general, a shipment from the United States to Canada
11 See, e.g., INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 423, at 831-57
(Sept. 8, 1982) (reprinting Dresser France's motion to vacate temporary denial order);
Id. at 879 (Sept. 14, 1982) (Creusot-Loire motion to vacate order); 18 INT'L TRADE
REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 7 (Oct. 5, 1982) (D.C. district court denies
Creusot-Loire motion for a temporary restraining order); Id. at 167-69 (Nov.' 2,
1982) (Creusot-Loire loses its motion to vacate denial order before agency review
commissioner); Id. at 199-200 (Nov. 9, 1982) (Dresser France loses in bid for
temporary restraining order in D.C. district court and appeal of agency ruling
upholding denial order).
11 47 Fed. Reg. 51,858 (1982).
" 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(m).
11 For articles discussing the impact of the pipeline sanctions, see Atwood, The
Export Administration Act and the Dresser Industries Case, 15 L. & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1157-61 (1983); Kincannon, The Dresser Case: One Step Too Far, 5 N.Y.L.S.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 191-230 (Spring 1984); Marcus, Soviet Pipeline Sanctions: The
President's Authority to Impose Extraterritorial Controls, 15 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus.
1163-67 (1983); Moyer & Mabry, supra note 33; Zaucha, The Soviet Pipeline Sanc-
tions: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Export Controls, 15 L. & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1169-79 (1983); Zeigler, The Siberian Pipeline Dispute and the Export Ad-
ministration Act: What's Left of the Extraterritorial Limits and the Act of State
Doctrine?, 6 Hous. J. INT'L L. 63-91 (Autumn 1983). See also NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST (1987).
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for use in Canada requires no license." Canadian and U.S. officials
meet regularly to discuss the administration and enforcement of stra-
tegic export controls. Law enforcement and national defense entities
also work closely together .56 Despite this long history of amicable
cooperation, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. export control laws
holds the potential for conflict between the United States and Canada.
The problem is especially vexing not in the area of national security
controls (upon which Canada and the United States agree by virtue
of their participation in COCOM), but rather in the area of foreign
policy controls on the export of goods and technology. While the
United States and Canada have basically the same national security
goals, their foreign policy goals often diverge. It is this divergence
which creates the potential for continuing conflict between the two
countries.
The conflict is particularly evident in the instance of the re-export
of U.S.-origin goods or technology from Canada. When Canadian
officials receive a request to export U.S.-origin goods, naturally they
evaluate the request first on the basis of whether Canadian law or
policy imposes a licensing requirement. Absent any Canadian controls,
however, they then must look to American law and policy to determine
whether to issue or to deny an export permit on the basis of American
export control criteria. A series of examples will reveal the extent of
the problem. 57
Example 1. Item of U.S. origin and on COCOM list.
To re-export an item from Canada to a controlled destination, a
Canadian exporter must obtain a Canadian export license because
the item appears on the COCOM list. The exporter also must obtain
a re-export license issued by the United States because of U.S. re-
export control laws. The licensing requirement by the United States
is superfluous because both countries control exports of goods listed
by COCOM in the same manner.
1 15 C.F.R. § 385.6 (1988) (shipment requiring licenses). The general rule is not
to require licenses for shipments of commodities and technical data to Canada for
consumption within the country. However, when the commodities or technical data
are "transitting" Canada or are to be re-exported from Canada to another foreign
country, and such a shipment would require a validated license if it were made
directly from the U.S., then an export license or reexport authorization is required.
36 Fried, supra note 6, at 191-93.
11 These examples are drawn from Hypotheticals and Discussion Following the
Remarks of Mr. Jonathan Fried and Mr. Arthur Downey, 11 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 199-
211 (1986) [hereinafter Hypotheticals].
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Example 2. Item of U.S. origin and on U.S. foreign policy list.
To be re-exported from Canada, the exporter would need to obtain
a Canadian license by virtue of the item's U.S. origin. But depending
on the product and destination, the exporter also may need a U.S.
license because of U.S. foreign policy controls.
Example 3. U.S. goods, unaltered, and stocked for shipment to
any number of destinations.
A Canadian export license is needed since it is a U.S.-origin good
that has not been substantially transformed. If the American supplier
has reason to believe the product may go to a controlled destination,
he must notify the U.S. authorities of that fact and the Canadian
exporter must obtain a U.S. re-export license before the item may
be shipped to a controlled destination.
Example 4. Canadian product derived from U.S. technology.
Only if the product is on the COCOM list or is a strategic good
would Canada require a permit. If the product is destined for a
country under U.S. foreign policy controls, the exporter also would
have to obtain a U.S. re-export license for the product. This extra-
territorial licensing burden defies the undeniable logic of allowing
Canada to use its own export control process to license the exports
of Canadian companies producing products in Canada.
Example 5. Destination: Cuba-American foreign policy controls
but no Canadian foreign policy controls.
Outside the realm of strategic goods, Canada does not restrict trade
with Cuba. The United States essentially prohibits direct trade with
Cuba. For U.S. subsidiaries in Canada to trade with Cuba, the product
must contain less than 20 percent U.S.-origin components and the
Canadian subsidiary, through its parent company, must obtain a re-
export license for products.5" Additionally, if the Canadian consignee
subsequently re-exports the goods without a U.S. license, the consignee
may be subject to prosecution in the United States, although it never
had any physical presence there.5 9
Is 15 C.F.R. § 385.1(b)(2) (1988). In the wake of the pipeline debacle, the United
States has adopted a more relaxed stance, essentially exempting from the license
requirement U.S.-origin goods which have been substantially transformed.
59 15 C.F.R. §§ 387-88 (1988) contain criminal and civil penalties for violation
of export control laws. For willful violations, these range from denial of export
privileges to fines of up to $1 million and prison terms up to 10 years.
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There is no symmetry, however, regarding U.S. enforcement of
export restrictions to destinations under Canadian foreign policy con-
trols. For example, Canada would not permit the direct export of
military items to Taiwan. If a U.S. importer planned to re-export
military goods of Canadian origin to Taiwan, there is no guarantee
of reciprocal enforcement of Canadian foreign policy controls. The
Canadian government would expect the United States to deny the re-
export on the basis of Canadian policy.6 Yet should the re-export
take place, the Canadian government would not assert direct juris-
diction over the American consignee for violation of its foreign policy
controls. 6 1 This is in stark contrast to the near universal jurisdiction
asserted by the United States over the activities of all entities in the
export chain whether or not they actually have a physical presence
within the United States. Under the U.S. approach, consignees are
deemed to be bound by U.S. controls by virtue of the contractual
undertaking.6 2
Example 6. Technical Data.
As far as restrictions on technology transfer are concerned, the
two countries still are very far apart in their definition of what requires
a license. Canada requires an export license only for technical data
in tangible material form and related to U.S.-origin goods or goods
appearing on the COCOM list.63 The product of this data may be
controlled but not the data itself. On the other hand, the United
States imposes export license requirements on data in virtually all
forms-design, process, know-how, and other tangible and intangible
forms of technical data not generally available to the public.6 As
with goods, no license is needed for technology transfer from the
United States to Canada. But under the current law, a Canadian
company producing Canadian goods in Canada but using American
know-how must seek American re-export authorization to ship this
product to a country on the U.S. foreign policy control list.
Generally, controls over foreign products derived from U.S.-origin
technical data have been imposed only where there was some con-
tinuing connection with the United States, such as a licensing agree-
60 Hypotheticals, supra note 57, at 204; interview with David Ryan, supra note
36.
61 Hypotheticals, supra note 57, at 205-06.
62 Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 33, at 21.
11 See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
" 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a) (1988).
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ment, some written assurance of compliance by the user, or agreement
to abide by U.S. controls. 65 Of course, the pipeline controls have
now raised the possibility that the user may be bound not only by
rules which existed at the time of the contract but also by subsequent
changes in foreign policy which may impose restrictions retroactively. 66
By having to obtain two licenses, one from Canada and one from
the United States, Canadian companies are at a disadvantage com-
pared to their American counterparts. The Government of Canada
has conducted no formal studies to assess the burden placed on
Canadian companies by the U.S. export license requirements. An-
ecdotal evidence, however, suggests that many Canadian firms must
consider not only their own national requirements but also must
factor into their decision-making the uncertainties occasioned by the
volatility of U.S. export regulations as well as day-to-day annoyances
such as delays in the U.S. licensing process. 67
THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
In view of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. export control laws
and differences in interpretation extending even to the definitions of
terms such as "origin," "substantially transformed," and "technical
data," one might expect the Free Trade Agreement to have produced
some clarification of meanings or some relaxation of U.S. require-
ments, especially in the re-export field. On the other hand, the
Agreement established a free trade area, not a Customs Union re-
quiring a common external trade policy. Thus it is not surprising
that the export control provisions of the FTA are skeletal at best.
National security considerations are addressed in Article 2003 which
states:
Subject to Articles 907 and 1308, nothing in this agreement shall
be construed:
a) to require any Party to furnish or allow access to any infor-
mation the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential
security interests;
b) to prevent any Party from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests.
i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of
war and to such traffic in other goods, materials and services as is
65 See Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 33, at 20-26.
66 Id. at 9-11.
67 Interview with David Ryan, supra note 36.
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carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a
military establishment,
ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations, or
iii) relating to the implementation of national policies or inter-
national agreements relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive device; or
c) to prevent any Party from taking action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance
of international peace and security.68
This article essentially reproduces GATT Article XXI, which permits
signatories to restrict trade for national security reasons. 69 Articles
907 and 1308, as referenced above, carve out additional national
security exceptions for energy trade and for government procure-
ment.7 0
Chapter 4 of the FTA contains provisions directly bearing on export
restrictions. Article 407 sets out the rules governing import and export
restrictions under the parties' rights and obligations as signatories of
the GATT. Paragraph 3 of the Article states:
In circumstances where a Party imposes a restriction on importation
from or exportation to a third country of a good, nothing in this
agreement shall be construed to prevent the Party from:
a) limiting or prohibiting the importation from the territory of
the other Party of such good of the third country; or
b) requiring as a condition of export of such good of the Party
to the territory of the other Party, that the good be consumed within
the territory of the other Party.
68 FTA, supra note 9.
6 Art. XXI allows a contracting party to refuse to disclose information contrary
to its security interests, to take any action considered necessary to protect its interests
related to fissionable materials, traffic in arms and ammunition, and actions taken
in time of war or international emergency. Also, parties are free to act to pursue
obligations under the United Nations Charter to maintain peace and security.
70 FTA, supra note 9. Art. 907 allows restrictions to the extent necessary to:
(a) supply a military establishment of a Party or enable fulfillment of a
critical defense contract, of a Party;
(b) respond to a situation of armed conflict involving the Party taking the
measure;
(c) implement national policies or international agreements relating to the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; or
(d) respond to direct threats of disruption in the supply of nuclear materials
for defense purposes.
Art. 1308 provides that notwithstanding art. 2003 on national security, for purposes
of Chapter 13, the provisions of art. VIII of the Code shall apply.
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In Paragraph 4 of Article 407, the parties pledge that should one
party impose restrictions on imports of a good from third countries,
the parties upon request by either party shall consult on ways to
avoid undue interference with or distortion of pricing, marketing,
and distribution arrangements in the territory of the other party.
Only one other Article addresses directly the issue of export con-
trols. Paragraph 2 of Article 409 states:
With respect to the implementation of the provisions of this Article,
the Parties shall cooperate in the maintenance and development of
effective controls on the export of each other's goods to third
countries.
To foster this cooperation, some progress was made in providing
clearer definitions of terms bearing on the issue of jurisdiction over
exports. In Annex 301.2, the FTA addresses the issue of what con-
stitutes "substantial transformation" of a good, i.e., the point at
which a U.S.-origin good becomes a Canadian good by virtue of
further processing or assembly with other components in Canada.
Paragraph 2 states that such transformation is deemed to occur when
the processing or assembly results in a change in tariff classification
according to the Harmonized System of Tariffs. Even if the tariff
classification does not change, origin still may shift to the other party
if not less than 50 percent value is added during processing in the
territory of the other party.
One point, however, should be kept in mind. The relatively detailed
exposition of rules of origin in the FTA was not prompted by problems
generated by the effect on Canada of overreaching U.S. export con-
trols. Rather, this detail was prompted by the two sides' desire to
restrict the benefits of the trade agreement to themselves. The rules
of origin were set up to filter out third-party goods, not to distinguish
between indigenous products. 7' Thus, discrepancies could arise be-
tween the origin of goods for the purpose of the FTA and the origin
of goods for purposes of unilateral export controls. 72 Indeed, in the
implementing legislation passed by Congress in September 1988, sec-
tion 102(a) states that "no provision of the Agreement, nor the
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance,
Interview with David Ryan, supra note 36.
72 See Baker and Battram, The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 23
INT'L LAW. 37, 38 (1989). The authors point out that there could be discrepancies
in origin of goods for the purpose of the FTA and the origin of goods for the
purposes of quota or voluntary restraint agreements with third countries.
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which is in conflict with any law of the United States shall have
effect." 73
Another definitional problem arises in Paragraph 3(b) of Article
407. There the parties agree that in exchange for controlled items
passing license-free between the two countries, the item must be
"consumed" within the territory of the other party. While "con-
sumption" may be a straightforward concept when applied to items
such as agricultural commodities and raw materials for industry, it
is less clear what it constitutes for manufactured items. For example,
a Canadian company might import a U.S.-origin computer with the
expectation that the computer will have a useful life of three years.
At the end of that time, the company may choose to upgrade to
another model and have the used equipment sold elsewhere. For the
purpose of the original export to Canada, the computer has been
consumed. Whatever its subsequent destination may be, its export
should be controlled solely by Canadian laws. 74 But the United States
would attempt to continue to exert its re-export jurisdiction if the
computer were destined for a country under a foreign policy control.
Clarification of this and other definitions in the FTA will have to
await further negotiations.
A potential moderator of the effect of U.S. extraterritorial controls
may be the incorporation of national treatment provisions from GATT
Articles X17 5 and XX76 into the FTA. In Article 407 of the FTA, the
parties affirm their rights and obligations under the GATT regarding
prohibitions or restrictions on bilateral trade. 77 Similarly, in Article
501 the parties pledge to accord national treatment to the goods of
the other in accordance with the GATT. It has been suggested that
these provisions may preclude the extraterritorial enforcement of U.S.
laws when jurisdiction is based on corporate nationality. 78 Canada
71 United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-449, § 102(a), 102 Stat. 1851, 1853 (1988).
14 Interview with David Ryan, supra note 36.
71 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XI, para. 1. Article XI, paragraph
1 provides for the elimination of quantitative restrictions on importation or expor-
tation of products between contracting parties. Paragraph 2 offers exceptions to the
general prohibition stated in paragraph 1.
76 Id. art. XX. Art. XX allows exceptions to national treatment in order to protect
public morals, health, gold and silver trade, law enforcement, exclusion of products
of prison labor, national cultural treasures, to preserve exhaustible natural resources,
and to prevent domestic short supply.
77 FTA, supra note 9, art. 407.
78 Fried, Competitive Impact of Canadian and U.S. Export Control Regulations:
The Canadian Dimension, 14 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 75, 80 (1988).
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has pledged under the FTA to encourage U.S. investment into Canada
and to treat such entities exactly as it would treat a Canadian cor-
poration. In light of the entity's status and treatment as a Canadian
corporation, it would be inconsistent for the United States to continue
to apply U.S. export controls to that corporation. Should this U.S.
control continue, in essence, a U.S. corporation would carry different
rights and obligations into Canada than a Canadian corporation would
have respecting its Canadian activities. This would place Canada in
the position of having to treat the corporation differently to respond
to U.S. authority and would seem to violate the principles of national
treatment.
OMNIBUs TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 198879
With so many trade issues on the table for discussion between the
United States and Canada, export controls, especially the extrater-
ritorial application of U.S. controls in Canada, was not one of the
issues high on the list for resolution in the FTA. But these problems
can be alleviated by another avenue. Just as the United States can
act unilaterally to extend the impact of its controls, it can act to
reduce them. It should be noted that, whatever the effect of U.S.
foreign policy controls on Canadian exporters, the U.S. export com-
munity also suffers from lost business opportunities and diminished
competitive position. 0 The impact on competitive position is partic-
ularly acute because many of the same goods and technologies placed
under export restrictions by the United States are freely available
from competing foreign suppliers."' The Soviet pipeline restrictions,
with their sweeping assertion of extraterritorial reach, their retroac-
tivity, their impact on alliance relations, and the consequent erosion
of confidence in the reliability of U.S. suppliers, provided the main
impetus for the export control reform initiatives contained in the
79 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (1988).
10 For a general discussion of the negative effect U.S. export controls have on
the U.S. export community, see Moyer & Mabry, supra note 33, at 144-56. (Economic
costs to the export community include "the costs of lost transactions, damaged
business relationships, and lost market shares."). See also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST 103-33 (1987); PRACTICING LAW IN-
STITUT, COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS, course handbook series no. 353
(1983); TECHNOLOGY CONTROL, COMPETITION, AND NATIONAL SECURITY (B. Seward
ed. 1987) [hereinafter Seward].
1 Seward, supra note 80, at 77-109. See also 62 CONG. DIG. 170-92 (1983)
(arguments pro and con on improving foreign availability analysis).
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Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.2 In the Act, Con-
gress took the opportunity to address directly and indirectly the
problems created by the extraterritorial impact of export control
regulations.
In section 2404(a)(4), the new law eliminates re-export licenses for
nearly all goods and technology sold to COCOM countries plus what
are known as "5(k)" countries. 3 Re-export licenses continue to be
required for goods and technology relating to supercomputers, com-
modities for sensitive nuclear uses, and "bugging" devices. 4 Addi-
tionally, the Commerce Secretary may require re-export permits for
certain end-users."5 In place of the requirement for re-export licenses,
the Secretary may require notification of re-export but only after the
fact, not prior to re-export.8 6
In Section 2404(a)(5), the new law eliminates the need for re-export
licenses for U.S. parts and components incorporated into foreign-
made goods when the value of controlled U.S. content is 25 percent
or less of the total value of the goods into which they are incor-
porated.8 7 Also, the re-export license requirement is eliminated for
the re-export of goods and technology to a country under foreign
policy controls if only notification, not licensing, is required by
COCOM.88 However, parts and components incorporated in super-
computers, regardless of technology level or value of U.S. content,
remain subject to re-export licensing.8 9 Additionally, at the time the
President imposes or expands foreign policy controls, the President
must determine whether the export controls will apply to replacement
parts for goods subject to control20
The Act also encourages the President first to pursue diplomatic
alternatives before imposing new controls or expanding or extending
existing controls on items available from other sources. 91 The amend-
82 See 62 CONG. DIG. 170-92 (1983) (arguments pro and con on limiting foreign
policy controls).
83 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a)(4)(A) (1989). The term "5(k)" comes from 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2405(k) which refers to countries, other than COCOM members, who cooperate
with the United States on export controls. Currently only Switzerland has been
designated as a 5(k) country meeting U.S. standards for export controls.
14 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2404(a)(4)(B) (1989).
85 Id. § 2404(a)(4)(B)(iv).
86 Id. § 2404(a)(4)(A).
87 Id. § 2404(a)(5)(i).
88 Id. § 2404(a)(5)(A)(ii).
89 Id. § 2404(a)(5)(B).
Id. § 2405(p).
91 50 U.S.C. § 2405(a)(6) (1989).
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ment suggests alternatives such as withdrawal of ambassadors, re-
ductions of embassy staff, private discussions with foreign leaders,
or public statements where private discussions fail.
The Act represents a step forward in terms of easing the admini-
strative burden on not only U.S. exporters but also their licensees,
consignees, and subsidiaries worldwide. One report estimates a 25
percent reduction in the number of export license applications for
goods and technology destined for COCOM countries and other Free
World nations. 92 The reform of the re-export controls is designed to
reverse the trend to design out American products simply because of
the licensing requirements. 9 The Act continues legislative efforts to
limit the President's wide-ranging discretion to impose foreign policy
controls that has so greatly damaged the United States' reputation
as a reliable supplier of goods and technology to the world.
As burdens are decreased for American firms, so are they decreased
for Canadian firms. The relaxation of licensing requirements means
that Canadian exporters will not be subjected as often to the necessity
of obtaining U.S. export licenses in addition to Canadian licenses.
But several limitations should be kept in mind. First, none of the
statutory changes in the Act is self-implementing. 94 The existing con-
trols will remain in effect until the Commerce Department produces
final regulations after a period of notice and comment, a process
which has extended well into 1989. 91 Unfortunately, delays and dif-
ferent interpretations are beginning to appear in the proposed re-
gulations.
The Act eliminates all licensing requirements for exports of goods
and technology to COCOM and 5(k) countries that have "effective"
export control systems. 96 The Act directs the Secretary of Commerce
to determine which countries have qualifying control systems within
three months of the enactment of the law. Although the Commerce
Department is preparing a report evaluating COCOM members, the
92 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988: A Straightforward Guide to its Impact on U.S. and Foreign Business 23
(1988).
93 Id. See also 62 CONG. DIG. 178 (statement of Rep. Don L. Bonker) and 186,
188, 190 (statement of Scientific Apparatus Makers Ass'n).
9, See 2 EXPORT CONTROL NEWS, Sept. 20, 1988, at 2.
91 2 EXPORT CONTROL NEWS, Nov. 23, 1988, at 2.
96 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(b)(2)(C). "Effective" controls would consist of a program
to evaluate export license applications, an appropriate documentation system, pro-
cedures for exchange of information with COCOM, and laws with consequent civil
and criminal penalties for violations.
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list of qualifying nations apparently will not be made public. By
designating nations with effective export control systems, the Secretary
would also be identifying those not meeting that level of control.
Negotiations among the COCOM members are rancorous enough
without dropping such a diplomatic bombshell in the midst of U.S.
efforts to strengthen the system as a whole. 97 Designation of other
nations to receive exports license-free also impinges on Canada's
unique status with the United States for cross-border exports. The
passage of goods license-free from the United States into Canada
may be seen as a quid pro quo for Canada's enforcement of U.S.
export controls,9 to the detriment of its own exporters. It is unclear
what would be offered by the United States to replace this incentive
if countries other than Canada become members of this heretofore
exclusive club.
In the proposed regulations for parts and components, the Com-
merce Department, apparently at the recommendation of the State
Department, has proposed that the 25 percent threshold not apply
to items controlled for foreign policy reasons or for nuclear non-
proliferation reasons.9 The regulations would require that the U.S.
value not exceed $10,000 or 10 percent of the final value of the
product destined for re-export. This distinction places tighter controls
on re-exports for foreign policy reasons than those for national
security reasons. If this regulation becomes final, it would complicate
the re-export control regime because most goods subject to national
security controls are also under foreign policy or nuclear nonprolif-
eration controls.
In a related matter, foreign policy controls may still have retroactive
effect. According to the conference report accompanying the Act,10'
the term "controlled U.S. content" is intended to mean that no re-
export license will be required at the time of re-export as long as
the United States does not require at that time a validated license
for the new destination. Thus, a Canadian re-exporter could still be
bound by imposition of new U.S. foreign policy controls or tightening
of existing controls in the future.
See 2 EXPORT CONTROL NEWS, Dec. 22, 1988, at 3 (includes an evaluation of
individual members of COCOM).
9S Interview with David Ryan, supra note 36; interview with T.S.E. Jones, Dept.
of National Defence, Jan. 17, 1989.
99 See 2 EXPORT CONTROL NEWS, supra note 95, at 3.
100 H.R. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 809 (1988).
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CONCLUSION
From the foregoing discussion it is obvious that many disparities
between the Canadian and U.S. export control systems remain to be
resolved. These differences could become the source of more conflict
as other trade barriers fall during the course of implementing the
FTA over the next ten years. Rather than hoping for some grand-
scale overhaul of the U.S. system, Canada can contribute best by
pursuing incremental change through the avenues opened by the FTA.
One of the first areas that needs to be addressed is determining the
appropriate scope of definitions of the terms of the Agreement.
Canada has already initiated discussions over the definition of "wool"
for the purpose of administering textile tariff rate quotas under the
FTA.' °' Certainly terms in the export control provisions, such as
"origin," "substantially transformed," and "consumed," could bene-
fit from closer scrutiny. Also the meaning of the FTA's national
treatment provisions remains to be resolved.
Article 407 of the FTA export section is very important to the
success of creating a more uniform control system. It institutionalizes
the long tradition of bilateral consultation on these matters. Either
side may request consultations on export controls to avoid interference
with pricing, marketing, and distribution arrangements. By means of
this process Canada has the opportunity to influence U.S. foreign
policy controls to be more focused, to urge the United States to
pursue multilateral rather than unilateral sanctions, and to point out
potential hardships that unilateral controls could work on the Ca-
nadian economy.
Success in these binational discussions could have positive effects
beyond the borders of North America. The pursuit of common ground
could set an example for COCOM to follow in developing minimum
standards for its member countries. It also may provide an example
for members of the European Community to follow in preparing for
their proposed integration in 1992. Indeed, one of the reasons given
for the relaxation of export controls in the Trade Act of 1988 was
to move toward the goal of an export-license-free zone among CO-
COM countries.10 2 To achieve this goal, the United States-Canada
relationship will be watched carefully for signs of a truly symmetrical
allocation of rights and responsibilities.
101 The law firm of Stikeman, Elliott, Ottawa Brief 7 (Feb. 1, 1989).
102 See H.R. Rep. No. 576, supra note 100, at 810.
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The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement is an admirable
experiment aimed toward achieving a more fully integrated North
American market. As tariff barriers are phased out, the remaining
non-tariff barriers, such as export controls, must be resolved in such
a way as to minimize trade friction between Canada and the United
States. By moving toward a bilateral consensus on export controls,
the United States and Canada will improve their ability to meet the
trade challenges of the 1990s and beyond.
